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This paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their 
ability  to  enforce  the  compliance  of  those  centers  with  anti-money  laundering  regulations. 
Offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor's identity 
and the origin of his/her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm 
to the investor. We show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and 
can benefit both the bank industry and tax administrations. We show that social optimal pressure 
policies are dichotomous decisions between no pressure at all and a pressure great enough to 
persuade offshore banks to comply. The delegation of pressure policies to onshore tax institutions 
may be inefficient. Deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center. 
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O⁄shore ￿nancial centers are often viewed as parasites that thrive by attracting tax cheaters
and money-launderers.12 However, sovereignty and democratic independence limit the ability of
international bodies to intervene directly in the private economy of o⁄shore ￿nancial centers. As
noted by Abbott and Snidal (2000), ￿diminution of sovereignty makes states reluctant to accept
hard legalization, especially when it includes signi￿cant levels of delegation￿ . This di¢ culty is
emphasized by the fact that bank secrecy represents an important asset of o⁄shore ￿nancial
centers. However, since the early 1990s, there have been multilateral e⁄orts to address money
laundering. Using the OECD list as its basis, the Leaders of the Group of Twenty recently
pledged to take sanctions against tax havens that do not share information in the ￿ght against
tax evasion and money laundering.3
Many scholars are skeptical about the e⁄ectiveness of this soft law practice as a means
for disciplining o⁄shore centers. A common argument often raised against this practice is
that money laundering and bank secrecy are inextricably linked and combating ￿nancial crime
can only be achieved by undermining con￿dentiality laws (Antoine, 1999). Other arguments
are more speci￿cally concerned with the lack of incentives to cooperate (Masciandaro, 2005).
According to FitzGerald (2004), compliance with international regulations must be enforced
especially on ￿nancial intermediaries, but while states may face international sanctions, there
is no direct way to punish private sector actors, as they have no status under international law.
In the following, we take the position that successfully enforcing anti-money laundering stan-
dards relies on the existence of incentives to comply with these regulations. Rather than focus
on the issue of national policymakers￿compliance (Mascandiaro, 2005), we explore ￿nancial
intermediaries￿incentives to implement "know your customer" standards in order to identify
and report dubious transactions. The reason is that this type of pressure hurts tax havens￿
reputations in the eyes of governments and investors and may thus lead to capital withdrawals
1Like Rose and Spiegel (2006), we de￿ne o⁄shore ￿nancial centers as jurisdictions that oversee a dispropor-
tionate level of ￿nancial activity by non-residents.
2The IMF (2004) de￿nes money-laundering as ￿a process in which assets obtained or generated by criminal
activity are moved or concealed to obscure their link with the crime￿ .
3See the o¢ cial communiquØ of the G20 London Summit (02/04/2009) at
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409
1and other economic damage.
The potential loss of reputation for banks that exhibit lax behavior towards anti-money
laundering practices is critical for analyzing o⁄shore ￿nancial intermediaries￿choices in com-
plying with controlling rules. In that context, we ask the following questions: Can reputation
loss provide enough incentive for banks to respond appropriately? Can compliance occur in
spite of the existence of bank secrecy? To address these issues, we develop a model that endog-
enizes the strategic choice of an o⁄shore ￿nancial center between lax and scrupulous attitudes
towards controlling the origins of investments. In that context, we assume that bank secrecy
provided by the o⁄shore center is not only a possible channel for illegal money transfers but
also as an opportunity for legal ￿nancial services coupled with tax advantages (Antoine, 1999;
Desai et al., 2006). Therefore we consider a two-country two-￿nancial center model with two
classes of investors. Ordinary investors seek the best investment return opportunity but feel
some (preference or geographical) distance from the o⁄shore ￿nancial center. Criminal investors
seek opaqueness and use the o⁄shore banks￿secrecy policy to launder money that is illegally
obtained and may be used for illegal purposes (e.g. illegal drugs, terrorism). In this paper, we
conform to the standards of existing literature by endogenizing interest rates and government
taxes. As is customary in the literature about banking competition and tax competition, we
assume that ￿nancial centers compete to attract investors and that governments independently
set taxes on interest payments. In addition to those actions, national or international insti-
tutions must decide to exert pressure on the o⁄shore bank and country, for instance, through
blacklisting policies and pressure on individuals who invest o⁄shore.
The ￿rst objective of the paper is to highlight the winners and losers of pressure policies. Our
second objective is to establish the conditions under which the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is con-
vinced to comply with scrupulous monitoring of an investor￿ s identity and the origins of his/her
funds, and therefore has the incentives to implement adequate customer due-diligence/know-
your-customer investigations. The third objective is to analyze the e¢ ciency of the decision in
terms of the e⁄ort required to blacklist an o⁄shore center and to campaign against o⁄shore in-
vestment. The fourth objective is to discuss the delegation of pressure policies against onshore
institutions like tax administrations. Indeed, because o⁄shore centers are very likely to be tax
2havens, anti-money laundering actions exerted by onshore institutions may also be (partially)
motivated by the desire to reduce tax losses. The ￿nal objective is to study the impact of
￿nancial integration, entry of o⁄shore ￿nancial centers and o⁄shore jurisdiction size on banks￿
compliance and money laundering.
Our results may be summarized as follows: First, we show that o⁄shore banks and countries
lose under pressure policies. More interestingly, this conclusion also applies for any (noncrimi-
nal) onshore investors, individually or in the aggregate. Surprisingly, the implementation of a
pressure policy might not only increase tax revenue, but also raise aggregate pro￿ts. This is
because the pressure policy is not only likely to harm investors but also to weaken interbank
competition. Second, we prove the existence of a pressure threshold above which the o⁄shore
￿nancial center complies with international regulation. This threshold increases with the share
of illegal investors and more interestingly with the degree of international ￿nancial integration.
To be e⁄ective, this pressure policy should make ordinary investors incur a reputational harm
that in monetary equivalent terms is larger than the banks￿cost of monitoring investors.
Third, we derive the e¢ cient pressure policy that a central planner who maximizes net
world surplus could implement to enforce o⁄shore ￿nancial center compliance. We ￿nd that
this planner would exert the needed pressure on o⁄shore centers only if the social cost of
money tra¢ cking exceeds a level that falls with deeper ￿nancial integration. Thus, deeper
￿nancial integration does not necessarily make money laundering more e⁄ective. Finally, the
pressure strategies determined by national or international institutions whose objectives are
biased towards tax revenue can be equal to or di⁄erent from the e¢ cient pressure strategies
set by the above planner. We show that onshore institutions adopt e¢ cient pressure strategies
if the social cost of criminality is high enough. Otherwise, if the cost of exerting pressure and
the cost of criminality are small, the onshore institution adopts an ine¢ cient pressure policy,
which is not enough to persuade the o⁄shore ￿nancial center to comply. In that case, the ￿ght
against money laundering chie￿ y serves to mitigate international banking and tax competition.
Finally, we analyze the case where several o⁄shore jurisdictions compete to attract onshore
investors. We show that the combination of pressure policies and o⁄shore competition can
help the onshore government to ￿ght criminality. In particular, o⁄shore jurisdictions do not
3open international ￿nancial centers that are lax and launder money under the condition that
their cost of setting up such a center is larger than the pro￿ts that would obtain from the
criminal investments only. We also study the impact of jurisdiction size on the incentives to
open an o⁄shore ￿nancial center. We show that a jurisdiction incurs an opportunity cost that
is proportional to its size so that only a small jurisdiction is enticed to open an international
￿nancial center. Such small jurisdictions can nevertheless be disciplined by an appropriate
pressure policy.
Related literature: This paper relates to the existing literature in public economics and
money laundering in o⁄shore ￿nancial centers. The public economics literature often discusses
the harm of o⁄shore ￿nancial centers applying tax competition models to o⁄shore capital. As
explained by Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Cremer and Pestieau (2004), much of the harm
(resp., desirability) of tax competition hinges on the presence of benevolent (resp., Leviathan)
governments. In particular, Slemrod and Wilson (2009) show that with the assumption of
benevolent governments, the presence of tax havens worsens tax competition problems and
that full or partial elimination of havens can improve welfare levels.
The present paper departs from the normative discussion of the desirability or harm of tax
havens and instead focuses on the positive question about the compliance incentives of o⁄shore
banks and governments. Also, in contrast to the above literature, this paper makes more pre-
cise modeling of the banking sector by introducing interbank competition and capital holders￿
heterogeneity. Recently, Rose and Spiegel (2007) followed a similar approach in discussing a
model with heterogeneous investors and (Stackelberg) competition between a domestic and o⁄-
shore bank. An important aspect highlighted in Spiegel and Rose (2007) is that the existence
of o⁄shore ￿nancial centers generates pro-competitive e⁄ects on international banking activity.
Our paper takes this point a step further by analyzing how this bene￿cial side e⁄ect impacts
the e¢ cient choice of a pressure policy and on governments￿attitudes towards o⁄shore centers.
Finally, the present paper also departs from the literature in its focus on money laundering.
Instead of focusing on ￿rms￿avoidance of tax liabilities (e.g., Desai et al. 2006), our discus-
sion concentrates on governments￿￿ght against criminal activities and the threat that money
4laundering creates. This threat has been prominently highlighted in the aftermath of Sept. 11,
2001. In this direction, Masciandaro (2005, 2006) shows that in the absence of international
law, onshore governments can ￿ght criminal activity and reduce its cost by damaging the in-
ternational reputation of o⁄shore centers. Our model takes into account both features of tax
competition and money laundering by introducing an ordinary and a criminal clientele.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Sections 3 and
4 characterize the equilibrium in respect to o⁄shore centers￿compliance and noncompliance,
Section 5 discusses the e¢ cient pressure policy and delegation to onshore institutions. Section
6 presents two extensions of the supply and size of o⁄shore jurisdictions. Section 7 presents our
conclusions.
2 Model
We consider a two-country two-￿nancial-center model. Let the onshore institutions be sub-
scripted by H (home) and the o⁄shore ones by F (foreign). The timing is as follows: First,
national or international institutions decide to exert pressure on the o⁄shore bank and country,
for instance, by blacklisting policies and pressuring individuals who invest o⁄shore. Second,
o⁄shore ￿nancial centers decide whether to monitor investment deposits. The o⁄shore and
onshore ￿nancial centers and governments simultaneously set their interest and tax rates on
deposits. The o⁄shore and onshore ￿nancial centers and governments simultaneously set their
interest and tax rates on deposits.4 Third, investors choose the bank where they deposit their
cash. Finally, the banks remunerate investors whereas investors pay their taxes on earned
interests. We now describe each side of the ￿nancial centers.
Each ￿nancial center i (i = H;F) collects funds from investors and o⁄ers a risk-free interest
rate ri. They invest those funds into risk-free assets that yield a given (world) rate of return
r and make a pro￿t on the intermediation margin r ￿ ri. Here we consider a small o⁄shore
￿nancial center that competes with a domestic ￿nancial center to attract investors located in
the domestic jurisdiction. We thus underline the fact that o⁄shore ￿nancial centers often have
4The timing of the tax and interest subgames does not qualitatively alter the results (see Picard and Pieretti
2009).
5very small populations and o⁄er intermediation services predominantly to investors residing
in large foreign economies. The o⁄shore jurisdiction provides strict bank secrecy while the
onshore center does not. It follows that the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is more vulnerable to
money laundering than other marketplaces where ￿nancial transactions are more transparent.
Like Rose and Spiegel (2007), we consider that each jurisdiction contains only one bank. This
allows us to focus on international ￿nancial competition.5
Financial centers are also asked to scrupulously monitor investors￿identities and money
origins. Because our focus is on the e⁄ect of the banks￿monitoring of investors plays on the
competition between ￿nancial centers and between governments, we simplify the monitoring
technology by assuming that banks are able to discover the criminal identity and money origin
of investors at a cost, c, proportional to the amount of monitored deposits. The main di⁄erence
between the onshore and o⁄shore ￿nancial centers is that the onshore ￿nancial center is obliged
by law to comply with the monitoring of investors whereas the o⁄shore center has no such oblig-
ation. Instead, the latter should be encouraged to monitor investors by onshore governments
or international institutions. Therefore, the o⁄shore ￿nancial center has an additional decision
variable, s 2 fm;og, where s = m denotes the scrupulous monitoring of the investors￿money
origins and s = o indicates a lax behavior on this issue.
Investors lend their capital to the ￿nancial centers. All investors reside in the home coun-
try H and are endowed with one unit of wealth that they deposit in the most advantageous
￿nancial center. The onshore economy contains S investors and the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is
assumed to have no local investors. Investors split into an ordinary and a criminal clientele.
On the one hand, we assume that there are (1 ￿ ￿)S (4=5 < ￿ < 1) criminal investors who
only seek opaqueness to conceal the illegally obtained origins of their money. For simplicity we
assume that those investors do not care about interest-earning and tax-saving: Their demand
for opaqueness is perfectly inelastic to the o⁄ered return. Individuals with money laundering
intentions are supposed to opt exclusively for the o⁄shore bank when it does not scrupulously
monitor ￿nancial transactions. If both jurisdictions do implement scrupulous monitoring, in-
dividuals who still seek opaqueness are supposed to look for another way of laundering money
5Competition is however imperfect, since we consider an international duopoly competing in o⁄ered interest
rates.
6(e.g., in underground banking like casinos, hawalawa 6...). We simplify our model by assuming
that owners of illegal money have no such option. Finally, we assume that the social cost of
each illegal dollar invested is equal to ￿. As a result, the social cost of the criminal activity
is equal to ￿(1 ￿ ￿)S when all criminal investors use the banking system. This parameter ￿
captures the social cost of this criminal behavior. It increases if the threat of criminality to
society rises (as can be perceived in the U.S. after 9/11/2001). It also increases when substitute
channels to the banking system for the money laundering business decrease and become less
e⁄ective. In this case, the elimination of money laundering in the o⁄shore ￿nancial centers
brings greater social bene￿t. The cost is assumed to vanish when o⁄shore ￿nancial centers
monitor their investors.
On the other hand, the onshore country hosts ￿S ordinary investors who invest money
legally and thus favor the ￿nancial center that o⁄ers the highest net rate of return. Indepen-
dent of tax and return considerations, we suppose that ordinary investors incur a cost of moving
assets abroad that mainly re￿ ects their reluctance to invest abroad. This reluctance may be
explained by legal di⁄erences and poor information about remote areas that diminish investors￿
con￿dence in foreign ￿nancial centers. The reluctance may also re￿ ect the geographical dis-
tance between investors and foreign centers, a factor that increases the perceived or actual cost
of monitoring their investments.7 We therefore assume that ordinary investors are uniformly
distributed along the unit segment according to their idiosyncratic reluctance to invest in the
o⁄shore banking sector. Consequently, we assume that the reluctance of an individual located
at x (x 2 [0;1]) is equal to the distance x that separates him from the o⁄shore center￿ s charac-
teristics multiplied by a (constant) unit cost k. Improvements in technology that bolster global
integration by creating international links between ￿nancial markets and facilitate the access
to foreign ￿nancial centers tend to lower transaction and information costs. The harmoniza-
tion of (international) ￿nance law also helps in reducing those costs. We thus interpret the
6Underground or ethnic banking systems are remittance systems that operate outside of (or parallel to)
traditional ￿nancial channels. They are becoming more and more popular today as ethnic diasporas grow
(Blum et al. 1998). The most commonly known informal systems are the Chinese chit or chop system of East
and Southeast Asia, the black market peso exchange system of Latin America, and the hawala system, with its
o⁄shoot the hundi system in South Asia (FitzGerald, 2004) .
7Whereas Rose and Spiegel (2006) consider the heterogeneity of depositors in terms of individual wealth, we
consider the heterogeneity of depositors in terms of their preferences for o⁄shore ￿nancial centers.
7coe¢ cient k as measuring the degree of international ￿nancial integration. On the other hand,
we consider that individuals seeking to conceal illegal money don￿ t exhibit a preference for the
home ￿nancial system.
Furthermore, following Sharman (2004), one dollar invested in a known place like the home
country does not, all things being equal, correspond to the same amount being invested in an
o⁄shore center. O⁄shoring money will cause investors to endure a premium that is likely to
increase with the loss of reputation of the destination jurisdictions in which they deposit. In
this vein, Sharman (2004, p.12) observes that, "investors tend to avoid or leave jurisdictions
with bad reputations not only out of concern that their money will be misappropriated, but also
because ￿rms risk harming their own reputations, as re￿ ected in their share prices." Accordingly,
to take account of the quality of the o⁄shore center￿ s reputation, we introduce a parameter a,
which represents the disutility that non-criminal investor incur by o⁄shoring their money in a
￿nancial center that does not scrupulously monitor the origin of its deposits. This parameter
encompasses various sources of utility losses that the ordinary investor associates with a deposit
in a bad ￿nancial center (e.g., in terms of patriotism, a warm glow, tax-evasion tagging). For the
sake of convenience, we label this parameter a as the "investor￿ s reputational harm", although
we do not intend to model any reputation game in this paper. Hence, the utility function of an





> > > <
> > > :
rH ￿ tH if i = H and s 2 fm;og
rF ￿ tF ￿ k ￿ x if i = F and s = m
rF ￿ tF ￿ k ￿ x ￿ a if i = F and s = o
In this de￿nition,the investor￿ s ￿rst option is to deposit in their home country, get the return rH
and pay the tax tH per unit of deposit. The second option is to invest in the o⁄shore ￿nancial
center, get the return rF and pay the tax tF but incur a utility loss k ￿ x that depends on the
investor￿ s reluctance to invest in the o⁄shore center. Finally, when the o⁄shore center does not
monitor, it is put under pressure by international organizations. This collective action may be
achieved through campaigns in the media, new regulations, publications of reports and statis-
8tics, categorization of tax havens and strategies of ￿naming and shaming￿ .8 In the following
we assume that investors who o⁄shore their money are also stigmatized by the international
pressure campaign and, in turn, incur a(n) (individual) reputational harm a. We ￿nally assume
that
minfr ￿ c ￿ k;r ￿ a ￿ kg > 0 (1)
So that it is always e¢ cient from the viewpoint of the o⁄shore ￿nancial center to attract the
most distant ordinary investor.
In this paper, the investor￿ s reputational harm is an endogenous parameter that depends on
the pressure that national and/or international institutions place on investors and the o⁄shore
￿nancial center. Such institutions can put pressure on the o⁄shore ￿nancial center by black-
listing them; they can put pressure on ordinary investors by informing them or campaigning
about the risks of investing o⁄shore, and by tagging and/or pursuing o⁄shore investors, etc. We
assume that the cost of exerting such a pressure is equal to C(a) = ￿a. Finally, in accordance
with standard tax competition literature, we assume that policy makers maximize their total
tax proceeds, each one taking the tax of the other country as given.
We now derive the equilibrium deposit supplies, interest and tax rates when the o⁄shore
￿nancial center either complies or does not comply with the scrupulous monitoring of investors.
3 Compliant o⁄shore ￿nancial center
In this section, we derive the equilibrium of the sequential decisions of investors, banks and
governments when each ￿nancial center decides to monitor the origin of invested funds and
refuses to accept illicit money (s = m). In this case, deposits are supplied only by ordinary
investors who do not incur any disutility from being associated to an o⁄shore bank.
The deposit supplies are obtained as follows. If the o⁄shore ￿nancial center monitors,
criminals are unable to use the banking system to launder money while the share of ordi-
nary investors lending their money in o⁄shore ￿nancial center is determined by the marginal
8For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) adopted by 1999 a ￿ name, shame and punish￿strategy
for countries that refused to comply with its recommendations for anti-money laundering.




(rF ￿ rH ￿ tF + tH) and xH = 1 ￿ xF
As a result, the deposit supply functions are equal to Di = ￿xiS (i = H;F).
On the one hand, ￿nancial centers i (i = H;F) select the interest rates that maximize
their pro￿ts ￿i by taking as given the taxes and the rival￿ s interest rate. That is, max
ri
￿i =
(r ￿ ri ￿ c)Di = ￿(r ￿ ri ￿ c)xiS where c is the monitoring cost. On the other hand, each
policy-maker i individually chooses her tax rate ti that maximizes her total tax proceed Ti,
taking the other country￿ s tax as given. That is, max
ti
Ti = tiDi = tixi￿S (i = H;F). The best




(r ￿ c ￿ k + tH + rF ￿ tF) and e tH =
1
2




(r ￿ c + rH ￿ tH + tF) and e tF =
1
2
(tH ￿ rH + rF)
As it is standard in the literature, interest and tax rates are strategic complement: an increase
in one bank￿ s interest rate triggers the rise of the other￿ s bank interest rate. So do increases in
tax rates. Accordingly, the interest rate di⁄erential is equal to e rH ￿ e rF = ￿1
3 [k + 2(tF ￿ tH)].
All taxes being equal, the onshore ￿nancial center sets a lower interest rate as it can take
advantage of legal investors￿preference for their home country. The equilibrium interest and
tax rates are given by
r
m























3 > 0, the onshore country always sets higher taxes. The o⁄shore country sets a lower
tax to attract a larger base of taxable deposits. Those results are consistent with the tax




5 < 0, the onshore ￿nancial center takes advantage of investor￿ s reluctance to
invest abroad and therefore sets a lower interest rate. Because the marginal o⁄shore investor
10is given by xm
F = 2












whereas the banks￿pro￿ts and tax proceeds write as ￿m




2 (i = H;F). In this
model, banks and governments get the same revenues because of their symmetric positions in
the interest and tax competition games.9
We now analyze the interesting case of a non compliant o⁄shore ￿nancial center.
4 Lax o⁄shore ￿nancial center
We now suppose that the o⁄shore ￿nancial center does not monitor investors￿identity and
money origin (s = o). In this case some pressure is exerted on investors who incur a reputational
loss a. We derive the equilibrium of the sequential decision of investors, banks and governments
in the following way.
When the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is lax, criminal investors are able to launder money in
the o⁄shore center. The share of legal money invested in each ￿nancial center is determined by





(rF ￿ rH ￿ tF + tH ￿ a) and xH = 1 ￿ xF
The deposit supply functions are equal to
DF = (￿xF + 1 ￿ ￿)S and DH = ￿xHS
Each ￿nancial center selects the interest rate that maximizes its own pro￿t by taking as
given the rival￿ s rate.10 That is, we have max
rF
￿F = (r￿rF)DF and max
rH
￿H = (r￿rH ￿c)DH.
Again, each policy-maker i determines her tax ti by maximizing her tax proceed Ti = tiDi
(i = H;F) taking the other tax as a given. As before, it is readily shown that interest rates as
9See Picard and Pieretti (2009) for a Stackelberg game between governments and banks.
10When the o⁄shore ￿nancial center adopts a lax behavior, it is not able to discriminate between criminal
and ordinary customers because it does not control of the investors￿identity and the origin of their funds.
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F = r ￿
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is the relative share of criminal investors (criminal investors versus legal ones). Interest rates
are positive by (1). At this equilibrium, the marginal investor who is indi⁄erent between the






(1 ￿ ￿) +
c ￿ a
5k
which belongs to the interval [0;1] if and only if
￿k (3 + 2￿) < a ￿ c < 2k (1 ￿ ￿) (2)
When a ￿ c is set above the highest boundary of this condition, investors￿reputational loss a
is so strong that ordinary investors avoid investing in the o⁄shore center. By contrast, when
a ￿ c is set below the lowest boundary, the monitoring cost is so high that the onshore bank
sets an interest rate that is unattractive for any ordinary investor. This last set of conditions
(2) determines an non empty interval and will be assumed from now for the sake of simplicity.
Note that both taxes are positive under conditions (2).






















while banks￿pro￿ts and tax proceeds simply write as ￿o




2 (i = H;F).
We can make the following remarks about tax and interest rate di⁄erentials.
124.1 Properties of tax and interest rates








[2a + 3c + k (1 ￿ ￿)] < 0
So, the o⁄shore bank sets higher interest rates. There are two reasons for this result. First,
the o⁄shore bank must raise its interest rate to attract legal investors who feel some reluctance
(in terms of geographical or characteristics distance). This e⁄ect diminishes however as the
￿nancial market becomes more integrated (lower k). Second, the o⁄shore bank must also set a
higher interest rate than its competitor to attract legal investors who su⁄er some reputational
harm when they are associated to a lax o⁄shore bank (a > 0).









[2(a ￿ c) + k (1 ￿ ￿)] (3)
This tax di⁄erential increases if investor￿ s reputation is more strongly harmed by institutional
pressures like blacklisting policy (larger a). The tax di⁄erential also increases if the onshore
￿nancial center has a smaller compliance cost (smaller c) as this change allows the onshore
center to increase its o⁄ered interest rate and to attract more deposits. The tax di⁄erential
increases if the number of legal money investors rises (smaller ￿) as this raises the demand for
onshore deposits. Finally, the tax di⁄erential decreases with ￿nancial integration (smaller k).
Deeper ￿nancial integration reduces banks￿intermediation markups, which in turn limits each
country￿ s opportunity to raise more tax on local investments.
It is important to note that, in contrast to the monitoring case and to tax competition
literature (e.g. Kanbur and Keen, 1993), the (large) onshore country does not always set the
largest tax rate. Indeed, by (3), the onshore country sets a lower tax rate if and only if
a < a ￿ c ￿
k
2
(1 ￿ ￿) (4)
where a lies between the boundaries in conditions (2). The onshore country sets a lower tax rate
13if the investor￿ s reputational harm is small enough compared to the monitoring cost. Higher
monitoring costs oblige the onshore ￿nancial center to decrease the o⁄ered interest, reducing
its markup and its attractiveness to investors. The onshore country is then forced to cut its tax
rate. Similarly, a fall in investor￿ s reputational harm makes the o⁄shore center more attractive
and forces the onshore country to cut its tax rate.
We now explore the e⁄ect on agents of an increase in the pressure on investors.
4.2 Winners and losers
In this section we show that the pressure on investors investing abroad does not only decrease
criminality but it also softens bank competition, which increases bank pro￿ts and tax revenue
and decreases o⁄shore and onshore investors wealth.
The investor￿ s reputational harm a impacts on the deposit supplies, interest rates and
taxes. Indeed, it can readily be shown that an increase in a entices investors to move their
investments from the o⁄shore ￿nancial center to the onshore one (dDo
H=da > 0 > dDo
F=da).
To resist the out￿ ow of investment, the o⁄shore ￿nancial center raises its interest rate. By
contrast, the onshore center can take advantage of a more captive set of investors and o⁄ers
a less advantageous interest rate (dro
H=da < 0 < dro
F=da). Since tax proceeds are congruent
with pro￿ts, the o⁄shore policy maker then reacts to the out￿ ow of investors by relaxing her
tax pressure whereas the onshore policy maker takes advantage of the repatriated investments
by augmenting its tax pressure (dto
H=da > 0 > dto
F=da). Hence, the o⁄shore ￿nancial center
and government are losers in this policy whereas the onshore center and governments are the
gainers. It is then readily understood that the o⁄shore ￿nancial lobbies and governments will be
vividly opposed to the pressure policy whereas the onshore ￿nancial lobbies will be promoting
it.
It is interesting to discuss the e⁄ect of investor￿ s reputational harm on the aggregate sur-
pluses of banks, governments and investors. Note ￿rstly that the onshore ￿nancial center and
government can gain more than what the o⁄shore center and government lose. Indeed, it is
14readily shown that the aggregate pro￿t ￿o = ￿o
H + ￿o























(a ￿ a) > 0
where a is de￿ned in expression (4). Therefore, the aggregate pro￿t increases with the investor￿ s
reputational harm if and only if a > a. In this case, ordinary investors who return to the onshore
￿nancial center accept a lower interest rate because they do no longer feel any reputational
harm and also because they avoid their idiosyncratic reluctance cost to invest o⁄shore. As a
consequence, the onshore center is able to realize larger intermediation markups; its pro￿t rises
at a faster pace than the fall of o⁄shore pro￿ts. It is remarkable that, by (4), this situation
occurs if and only if to
H > to
F; that is, if the o⁄shore country is a tax haven. This allows us to
conclude that the aggregate pro￿t increases with the investor￿ s reputational harm if and only
if the o⁄shore country is a tax haven. Because pro￿ts are congruent with taxes, the same
conclusion applies to tax revenues. So, when the o⁄shore country is a tax haven, banks and
governments could extract more revenues in the aggregate by supporting pressure on investors￿
reputation. Of course, their problem is that cooperation on those issues is hard to obtain.
We now look at the aggregate welfare of ordinary investors. In contrast to banks and

























includes the net return of onshore investment, the net return of o⁄shore investment minus the
reputational harm a from pressure to o⁄shore investors and ￿nally the aggregate utility loss













































15where the last term is nil by the de￿nition of the marginal investor xo
F who is indi⁄erent
between the ￿nancial centers. We know from the above paragraphs that the return o⁄ered
to onshore investors falls with larger reputational harm (d(ro
H ￿ to
H)=da) < 0), which reduces
their net utility. By contrast, the return of o⁄shore investors rises (d(ro
F ￿ to
F)=da) > 0) but
this gain does not outweigh their reputational loss a (d(ro
F ￿ to
F)=da < 1). Indeed, both the
o⁄shore ￿nancial center and government react to an increase in investor￿ s reputational harm
a by raising the o⁄ered interest rate ro
F and decreasing the tax rate to
F; however they can not
o⁄er to those investors a net return ro
F ￿to
F that fully compensates for their reputational harm.
In the aggregate, investors are thus negatively a⁄ected by the larger reputational harm. This is
because the harm on investor￿ s reputation does not only destroy the value of o⁄shore deposits
but it also weakens the competition that disciplines the onshore center. Hence, any lobby
representing ordinary onshore investors or onshore investors, or both groups shall be reluctant
to an increase in pressure resulting in a higher investor￿ s reputational harm.
We now study the condition under which the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is enticed to shift
from a lax behavior to a scrupulous monitoring.
5 Pressure policies and monitoring incentives
National governments and international institutions usually put e⁄ort in improving the regu-
latory compliance of o⁄shore ￿nancial centers and in deterring investors to deposit their funds
in those centers. Common practices include lobbying for blacklisting of non compliant o⁄shore
￿nancial centers or organizing information campaigns about investors￿risks in depositing o⁄-
shore. United States Patriot Act and several E.U. member states explicitly rely on the O.E.C.D.
(and F.A.T.F.) blacklists in drawing up their own national blacklists of tax haven jurisdictions
(Sharman, 2004).
As stated in Section 2, criminality generates a social cost ￿(1￿￿)S whereas exerting pressure
on o⁄shore ￿nancial centers and investors has a cost C(a) = ￿a. In addition to those costs, this
paper has highlighted two additional costs, namely, the investor￿ s reputational harm and the
related weakening of banking competition. The purpose of this section is to discuss the balance
16between those costs. To be more precise, we here investigate about the e¢ cient level of pressure
policy a. We ￿rst determine the pressure policy that entices o⁄shore banks to monitor. We
secondly adopt a normative perspective by asking for the e¢ cient pressure policy, which is the
pressure that would maximize the welfare of both onshore and o⁄shore countries. Finally, we
present a positive discussion about a pressure policy that is delegated to onshore governmental
agencies whose purposes are biased towards tax proceeds. The latter assumption is not too
unrealistic as most OECD countries have designated their treasury and ￿nance ministries as
lead participants in the Basel committees and in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)11.
In this respect, the Economist (2001, p.66) wrote: "some suspect that the O.E.C.D. would like
to use the ￿ght against money laundering to advance its parallel and controversial campaign
against an activity it calls ￿unfair￿tax competition [...]". In addition, the G20 leaders have
recently agreed to stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect their public ￿nances (OCDE,
2010). For each case we discuss the impact of ￿nancial integration on the pressure policy.
5.1 O⁄shore monitoring incentives
The o⁄shore ￿nancial center has an incentive to monitor the investor￿ s identity and money
















is positive. For any a satisfying conditions (2), this happens if Dm
F > Do
F, or if
a > aF ￿ c + 3k￿; (5)
where aF de￿nes the threshold of investor￿ s reputational harm above which the o⁄shore ￿nancial
center voluntarily complies and where aF satis￿es condition (2). The o⁄shore center should
11The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental organisation whose purpose is the devel-
opment and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist ￿nancing.
Out of 34 member countries, the lead authority in FATF delegations has been granted to Treasury or Finance
ministries/agencies for more than 16 countries including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, U.K. and
U.S.A..
17su⁄er a su¢ cient demand loss (through larger a) to choose to monitor its investors. Note ￿rstly
that the investor￿ s reputational harm a should be set higher than the bank￿ s monitoring cost c.
This re￿ ects the fact that the o⁄shore center must be enticed to forego its pro￿t on illegal money
investors. If the number of illegal investors rises, the pressure exerted on ordinary investors
should be even stronger (indeed, aF increases with ￿). Note secondly that the o⁄shore center
is more likely to monitor its investors for higher degree of international ￿nancial integration
(smaller k). Indeed, ￿nancial integration hurts more the lax o⁄shore center because the latter
must cut its intermediation margin not only on the ordinary investors but also on the captive
criminal ones.
5.2 E¢ cient pressure strategies
We now discuss the optimal pressure exerted by a benevolent social planner who maximizes an
objective that encompasses the economic surplus of both countries and the criminality damage




(Vi + ￿i + Ti) ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)S
where ￿a is the social cost of exerting pressure a and where ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S is the social cost
attached to the use of the banking system to criminal activity. The latter cost vanishes when
the o⁄shore ￿nancial center monitors its investors.
The economic surplus can readily be computed given that the total mass of ordinary in-
vestors is constant and equal to ￿S. For every unit of investment, the investor, the bank and
the government share the risk-free rate interest r. Indeed, the investor earns ri ￿ ti, the bank
r ￿ ri and the government ti, which all add up to r. In addition, an o⁄shore investor su⁄ers
from reputational losses from the pressure a and from the reluctance kx for investing in the
o⁄shore center. The banks incur the cost c when they monitor their investors. Therefore, if the
planner exerts a su¢ cient pressure to entice the o⁄shore ￿nancial center to monitor (a ￿ aF),













This function obviously decreases in a. If the planner exerts a too low pressure a (0 ￿ a < aF),
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F)(1 ￿ ￿)S ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S
The ￿rst term in the square bracket includes the economic bene￿t induced by ordinary investors
minus the welfare loss caused by their reluctance to invest in the o⁄shore bank and their
reputational loss a and minus the monitoring cost in the onshore center. The second term
represents the o⁄shore economic bene￿t of accepting illicit money and making an earning on it
(though the earning of illicit money holders ro
F is nevertheless not considered by the planner).
The third term is the cost of exerting pressure and the last term the social cost of criminality.
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=
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25k (1 + ￿)
[9(a ￿ aF) + 2k (15￿ ￿ 4)] ￿ ￿
where the square bracket in this expression is negative under a < aF and ￿ < 1=4. Hence, the
economic surplus decreases with stronger pressure and investor￿ s reputational loss a. As men-
tioned above, the investor￿ s reputational loss does not only destroy value for o⁄shore investors
but it also reduces the onshore￿ s investor surplus through the e⁄ect of relaxing the competition
for the bene￿t of the onshore ￿nancial center.
Because both objectives decrease in a on their respective supports, the planner￿ s optimal
pressure strategy is to set the smallest value of a on each support. As a result the planner sets
either a = 0 if W m(aF) < W o(0;￿) or a = aF if W m(aF) ￿ W o(0;￿). Given that the objective
W o decreases in ￿ we can infer the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold e ￿ for the social cost of criminality such that the social
19planner exerts no pressure if ￿ < e ￿ and exerts the pressure a = aF otherwise.
In her decision, the planner balances the social cost of criminality against the cost of reduced
competition. The unexpected property of our model is the dichotomy in the pressure policy.
Such a dichotomy stems from the fact that o⁄shore banks are homogeneous and make the same
monitoring choices at a = aF and the facts that there the welfare objective has a jump at
a = aF and falls in the ranges above and below this threshold. The reader will note that such a
dichotomy is robust to alternative assumptions. For instance, if banks were heterogeneous with
respect to their monitoring costs, they would nevertheless need to coordinate their monitoring
decisions to a same threshold because the investors￿reputation harm is attributed to the ￿nan-
cial center rather than to any single bank. Also, if criminals were heterogeneous with respect to
their preferences to launder money abroad, the total investment supply in o⁄shore banks would
still di⁄er under monitoring and lax behaviors and would still trigger a dichotomous change
in the o⁄shore banks￿monitoring decisions. Finally, the fact that welfare objective decreases
with the pressure policy emanates from the direct cost that the pressure policy imposes on the
government and from the indirect cost that the reputation harm imposes on both investors and
banks. The pressure policy is a harm on investors, which would be suppressed in the absence
of criminality. Changes in the speci￿cation of the investors￿supply functions would not alter
such a property.
We now turn to the issue of ￿nancial integration. How does the pressure policy change when
di⁄erentiation between ￿nancial centers falls (smaller k)? Di⁄erentiating totally the equality






















k2 ￿ 28￿ ￿ 26￿
2
￿
where ￿ < 1=4. This expression re￿ ects the opposite e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on the direct
cost of pressure policies and the economic ine¢ ciency they generate. On the one hand the ￿rst
term of the latter expression shows the e⁄ect of ￿nancial integration on the cost of the pressure
policy, ￿aF. As mentioned earlier, a fall in k decreases the pro￿t of the o⁄shore ￿nancial center
more in the lax scenario than in the monitoring case. As a consequence, the threshold aF falls
20with smaller k so that ￿nancial integration increases the e⁄ectiveness of the pressure policy.
The planner therefore needs to exert a weaker pressure to entice the o⁄shore bank to comply
to then monitoring their investors. This e⁄ect is naturally more important for higher cost of
exerting pressure, ￿. On the other hand, the second term in the last expression re￿ ects the e⁄ect
of ￿nancial integration on the economic surplus generated by the whole banking sector when
the o⁄shore bank is lax. In particular, a fall in k decreases the number of onshore investors
and therefore the bank￿ s cost of monitoring. This cost saving in the banking industry generates
an economic surplus that increases with weaker pressure policies. Hence, the planner has an
incentive to refrain from exerting a pressure policy and to exert the pressure policy aF for
higher costs of criminality ￿. To sum up, ￿nancial integration makes the pressure policy more
e⁄ective but more harmful for the e¢ ciency of the banking sector. Which e⁄ect dominates
depends on the cost of exerting pressure, ￿. Indeed,
de ￿
dk
> 0 () ￿ > b ￿ ￿
S
150￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
9c2
k2 ￿ 28￿ ￿ 26￿
2
￿
The threshold b ￿ is more likely to be positive if the economy includes fewer criminals (smaller
￿).
Proposition 2 As ￿nancial markets integrate (smaller k), the social planner is more likely to
entice the o⁄shore bank to monitor by exerting the pressure a = aF if and only if ￿ > b ￿.
This proposition also quali￿es the usual claim stating that ￿nancial globalization fosters
criminality. We have here shown that deeper ￿nancial integration encourages compliance by
o⁄shore centers. It furthermore entices the social planner to use this pressure when the cost of
￿nancial criminality is high enough compared to the cost of reducing interbank competition.
Under this condition, ￿nancial globalization reduces ￿nancial criminality.
The present analysis has relied on the unlikely existence of a social planner that aggregates
the interests of all (non-criminal) participants in the economy. As stated above, pressure on
o⁄shore centers is discussed, negociated and then implemented by international bodies which
comprise delegation of various member states whose objectives might be biased towards tax
revenues. This is the topic of the next section.
215.3 Delegating pressure policies to an onshore agency
We now discuss the case where the decision on the pressure policy is delegated to the onshore
tax agency. Such a delegation is indeed likely to arise because governments have a ￿scal interest
in eliminating fraud and because tax administrations are equipped with audit instruments to
check/threaten tax payers who possess o⁄shore bank accounts. In addition since onshore tax
proceeds are aligned with onshore pro￿ts, such a delegation can readily get the support of the
onshore banks￿lobby. We here show how such a delegation strategy can be socially ine¢ cient.
In this context, we assume that the onshore institution maximizes the tax proceed minus
the social cost of criminality net of the cost of the pressure policy, which is equal to ￿o(a;￿) =
T o
H(a)￿￿a￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S if a < aF and ￿m(a) = T m
H ￿￿a if a ￿ aF. We now derive the optimal
pressure policy chosen by this institution.
Let us ￿rst look at the case where the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is enticed to monitor its
investors (a ￿ aF). Then, neither the onshore tax proceeds nor the criminality level depend on
the level of the pressure policy a. As a result, the onshore institution optimally sets a = aF.
Let us then consider the case where the o⁄shore ￿nancial center is not enticed to monitor its
investors (a < aF). As noted in Section 4.2, the onshore tax proceeds T o
H(a) is an increasing
and convex function of a (because T o
H(a) rises with Do
H(a) which is a linearly increasing function
of a). So, from the onshore taxation point of view, there always exists an incentive to raise
the pressure policy and set a above zero. However, the choice of the pressure policy also has a
cost ￿a. Since the net tax bene￿t T o
H(a) ￿ ￿a is a convex function of a, the optimal pressure
policy on the interval [0;aF) must be either a = 0 or a = aF ￿", where " > 0 is in￿nitely small.
The second pressure policy, a = aF ￿ "; is explained by the fact that the onshore institution
(as well as the onshore banks) has an incentive to deter ordinary investors from o⁄shoring
their money. Such a deterrence strategy increases investors￿demand for the onshore center and
raises onshore pro￿ts and taxes. In addition, the onshore institution also has an incentive to
entice illegal money investors to go to the o⁄shore bank. Indeed, because the o⁄shore bank
will take advantage of this captive clientele, it will be able to lower its o⁄ered interest rates so
that the demand for the onshore bank will be boosted. The following proposition presents a
22full characterization of the pressure policy.Let
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Proposition 3 The optimal pressure policy of the onshore institution is to implement
(i) no pressure if ￿ > ￿ and ￿ < ￿2 (￿),
(ii) the pressure policy a￿ = aF ￿ " if ￿ < ￿ and ￿ < ￿1 and
(iii) the pressure policy a￿ = aF if ￿ > maxf￿1;￿2 (￿)g
Proof. See Appendix A.
Insert Figure 1 here
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal pressure policy for parameters (￿;￿). According to this
Figure and to Proposition 3, the onshore institution implements no pressure if the social cost of
criminality is low enough and the cost of the pressure policy is high. It implements the pressure
level aF ￿ " if the social cost of criminality is low and the cost of the pressure policy is low.
Finally, it implements a pressure policy that eliminates criminality through active monitoring
by the o⁄shore ￿nancial center if the social cost of criminality is high enough.
The pressure policy of the onshore institution is not fully aligned with the social planner￿ s
choice. In particular, if the cost of exerting pressure and the cost of criminality are small
enough, the onshore organization exerts a pressure but never to the point where the o⁄shore
￿nancial center monitors. It rather uses the pressure policy to relax interbank competition and
repatriate investments back to the onshore bank. This interesting result highlights the impact
of the tax repatriation motives in the ￿ght against money-laundering. Such motives can indeed
eliminate the incentives to have o⁄shore ￿nancial centers actually comply with ￿know-your-
customer￿and reporting regulations. Hence, such a pressure policy, presented under the label
of a ￿ght against criminality, may in fact be diverted to the objective of tax collection, with
the blessing of onshore ￿nancial centers.
23The result stated in Proposition 3 relies on the same dichotomy and discontinuity properties
as discussed for Proposition 1. A main di⁄erence is that the onshore tax revenue is an increasing
and convex function of the pressure policy. As a result, the tax agency may ￿nd it pro￿table to
push its pressure level up as long as the o⁄shore ￿nancial center chooses a lax behavior. Such
a convexity property stems from the existence of increasing returns from the pressure policy a.
Indeed, a rise in a does not only entice onshore investors to rappatriate their investment from
abroad but it also decreases their claims on onshore interest payments. So, the pressure policy
raises (multiplicatively) both the number of onshore investors and the mark-ups and taxes that
onshore ￿nancial center and government can impose.
How does this pressure policy change when ￿nancial integration increases (smaller k)? It is
￿rstly readily seen that ￿ decreases to zero and becomes negative as k falls. The intuition is
that smaller di⁄erentiation between ￿nancial markets does not only reduce pro￿ts but also tax
proceeds. So, the onshore institution is less enticed to exert pressure for tax motives. Secondly,
the threshold ￿1 also falls to zero with smaller k. Those two properties imply that the set of
parameters for which the tax agency sets the ine¢ cient pressure policy a￿ = aF ￿ " shrinks as
k falls. Financial integration therefore diminishes the incentives for the tax agency to set such
an ine¢ cient pressure policy.
6 O⁄shore jurisdiction supply and size
In this section we discuss the impact of pressure policies on the size and supply of o⁄shore
jurisdictions. We highlight several facts. First, large jurisdictions are served by only a small
set (if not a singleton) of dominant o⁄shore centers and those jurisdictions have small popu-
lations. For example, the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas host the largest banking services
directed towards U.S. clients,12 Jersey and Guernsey towards British customers, Hong Kong
towards various other Southeast Asian countries, Luxembourg towards its neighboring coun-
tries Germany, France and Belgium, Liechtenstein towards Germany, etc. Two reasons underlie
the small number of o⁄shore jurisdictions hosting an active international ￿nancial center. The
￿rst is that there seems to be strong legal and cultural product di⁄erentiation according to the
12The Cayman Islands host more than 40% of o⁄shore assets in 2001 according to Oral et al. (2005).
24onshore jurisdiction that is served. Many o⁄shore jurisdictions have historical and legislative
links with their o⁄shore jurisdictions. Legislative links help promote and adapt advantageous
￿nancial legislation in the o⁄shore jurisdictions while historical or jurisdictional links help ap-
pease international relations with onshore jurisdictions.13 On the other hand, because o⁄shore
services often lack product di⁄erentiation, competition is ￿erce amongst the o⁄shore jurisdic-
tions and ￿nancial centers that want to serve the same onshore customers. As a result, many
jurisdictions have incentives to forgo establishing or maintaining their legal advantages in order
to limit the o⁄shore centers that serve the same class of customers. As shown by the cases of
Haifa and Cuba, who were replaced by Beirut and the Bahamas after World War II (Palan,
1998), changes in o⁄shore dominance can be dramatic.
In this section, we extend the previous model to discuss the economic impact of a large
supply of o⁄shore jurisdictions on pressure policies. We then study the e⁄ect that the size of
the o⁄shore jurisdiction has.
6.1 Supply of o⁄shore centers
We now study the issue of the supply of o⁄shore centers. When many o⁄shore centers compete
for clientele from the same onshore center, the o⁄shore ￿nancial market is rarely pro￿table.
The onshore government eliminates criminal investments by preempting pro￿table activity in
the o⁄shore banking market.
We assume that the o⁄shore jurisdictions l = 1;2;:::;N are present in the international
￿nancial market that is considered by onshore investors. All o⁄shore banks make their moni-
toring decisions and then governments and ￿nancial centers make their decisions over tax and
interest rates. The di¢ culty of the present analysis lies in combining simultaneous competition
over interest and tax rates with the presence of two groups of perfectly mobile ordinary and
criminal investors. While the formal analysis is presented in the Appendix, we present here the
main results.
Both o⁄shore governments and banks play a Bertrand competition game in terms of tax
13For instance, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, Jersey, Gernsey, and the Netherlands
Antilles are or have been Overseas Territories or Crown Dependencies of the U.K, the Netherlands or the
U.S.A.. Luxembourg and Monaco￿ s law were inspired by French law and recently updated to E.U. legislation.
Monaco￿ s military defense is the responsibility of France. Liechtenstein￿ s diplomacy is delegated to Switzerland.
25and interest rates. Each o⁄shore ￿nancial center l, has an incentive to attract onshore ordinary
investors by o⁄ering the highest return net of tax or reputation loss; that is, either rl ￿tl when
it monitors or rl ￿ tl ￿ a when it is lax. They also have incentives to attract criminal investors
who incur no reputation losses. Similarly, the o⁄shore jurisdiction l also has incentives to
attract investors by diminishing its tax rate. The equilibrium interest and tax rates depend on
the con￿gurations of the set of monitoring decisions. Jurisdictions o⁄er their maximal interest
rates and set their taxes to zero in all con￿gurations, except where only a single compliant or a
single lax jurisdiction exists. Such equilibria are reminiscent of the tax and banking competition
literature that emphasizes the possibility of a race to the bottom in taxes and intermediation
margins. In the presence of lax centers, criminal deposits still exist but they bene￿t neither
o⁄shore lax banks nor their jurisdictions.
In con￿gurations where there is only one center in the group of compliant or lax centers, the
e⁄ect of competition is less dramatic. In both cases there will be pro￿t to share between this
￿nancial center and its government. On the one hand, if there is only one monitoring center,
this center is pro￿table and yields tax revenues if c < a. Indeed, the monitoring center is able
to o⁄er the interest rate r ￿ a, which cannot be overbidden by lax centers even though they
must set their highest rate at r because of the competitive pressure amongst themselves. The
monitoring jurisdiction generates the following pro￿t from its margin a ￿ c between the lax
centers￿reputational harm and its own monitoring cost:




This strategy is pro￿table only if c < a. On the other hand, if only one lax center exists, this
center may generate the value
￿FN = r(1 ￿ ￿)S
by targeting only on criminal investors, whereas it can generate the value




by attracting both criminal and ordinary investors, which is pro￿table only if c > a. In the
26Appendix we determine the con￿gurations of monitoring decisions that are Nash equilibria.
From this analysis, we can infer that a large supply of o⁄shore centers is detrimental for juris-
dictions and banks. In the absence of o⁄shore product di⁄erentiation, competition signi￿cantly
reduces o⁄shore pro￿ts and tax revenues. It also reduces onshore pro￿ts and tax revenues.
Competition does not however prevent o⁄shore banks from o⁄ering investment prospects for
criminals so that pressure policies are ine⁄ective.
Pressure policies nevertheless become e⁄ective when o⁄shore jurisdictions incur costs in
establishing and maintaining their international ￿nancial centers. Such costs are indeed not
negligible. International ￿nancial centers require supervisory bodies and auditing institutions.
Criminals also need the trust in and the reliability of o⁄shore bank institutions and products.
In addition, o⁄shore jurisdictions need to design appropriate laws for ￿nancial products and
institutions, pay for utilities, o¢ ces, supplies, and advertising for their own center. According
to Williams et al. (2005, p. 1180), "taking the estimated cost of complying with international
standards into accounts reduces the overall revenues by about 0.3 per cent of GDP." Those
costs can be so high that only the o⁄shore tax revenues from criminal investors are not able to
cover them.
So let the o⁄shore jurisdiction￿ s cost of setting up an international ￿nancial center be given
by K > ￿FN . If this cost is also larger than the maximal o⁄shore tax revenues, then no
o⁄shore jurisdiction will ￿nd it bene￿cial to open an international ￿nancial center that would
choose lax behavior. By (6), the onshore government can reduce ￿FN by setting a reputation
harm a su¢ ciently high and close to the monitoring cost c.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the cost of setting up an international ￿nancial center is larger
than the pro￿ts obtained only on criminal investments (K > ￿FN). Then, there exists a
threshold aFN (aFN < c) such that no o⁄shore jurisdiction opens/supports a lax international
￿nancial center if a ￿ aFN.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As a result, the combination of pressure policies and o⁄shore competition helps the onshore
government to ￿ght criminality. As a case in point, the pressure policy required to hinder
27criminals￿investments in a competitive o⁄shore market is smaller than the pressure policy aF
that was needed to eliminate criminal deposits in an o⁄shore monopoly (aFN > aF).
We conclude this discussion with two observations. First, the cost of setting up an in-
ternational ￿nancial center also has implications for the entry of o⁄shore jurisdictions in the
international ￿nancial market. Indeed, because of o⁄shore banking competition, only one or
a few o⁄shore jurisdictions and ￿nancial centers may be enticed to enter and/or survive. As
a result, incumbent o⁄shore jurisdictions may bene￿t from ￿rst-mover advantage, as potential
entrant jurisdictions may prefer not to sink the initial cost of establishing an international ￿-
nancial center. Similarly, tacit collusion amongst the few o⁄shore jurisdictions may help sustain
higher taxes and lower net returns for investors. In this case, the onshore government must
￿ght criminality in the same manner as the monopoly o⁄shore jurisdiction discussed in the
previous sections.
Second, although competition in the o⁄shore banking market increases investors￿returns,
it harms the onshore banking industry and diminishes tax proceeds. Because of the larger
investors￿surplus, a benevolent social planner (who maximizes the economic surplus of all
countries minus criminality damage in the onshore country) is likely to choose a policy pro-
moting an appropriate pressure policy and the entry of many o⁄shore ￿nancial centers. In
contrast, when the policy towards o⁄shore centers is delegated to the onshore tax agency, the
latter agency is likely to choose a policy promoting the concentration of the o⁄shore banking
sector in a single jurisdiction and that sets the ine¢ cient pressure level aF ￿ ".
We now turn to the issue of the impact of jurisdictional size on pressure policies.
6.2 O⁄shore jurisdiction size
We now clarify the role of an o⁄shore jurisdiction￿ s size on its choice to host an o⁄shore interna-
tional ￿nance center. Our main argument is that each o⁄shore jurisdiction and ￿nancial center
trades o⁄ the bene￿ts of targeting local investors and attracting foreign investors. In most
o⁄shore jurisdictions, local investors represent a small less-informed and less mobile group. In
opening an international ￿nancial center, each jurisdiction incurs an opportunity cost equal to
the amount of taxes lost on local investors. As a result, a smaller jurisdiction is more likely
28to open an o⁄shore international ￿nancial center because the smaller group of local investors
yields a smaller opportunity cost.
To develop this point, we assume a single o⁄shore center that hosts a mass LF ￿ ￿SlF of
local homogenous investors who do not invest abroad and, naturally, are not harmed by the
pressure policy. They invest their money in their local banking system only if they get a positive
net return rF ￿ tF. As before, the o⁄shore ￿nancial center chooses its monitoring strategy
and then both onshore and o⁄shore ￿nancial centers and jurisdictions independently set their
interest and tax rates (ri;ti), i = H;F.
The presence of local investors changes the investment supply of the o⁄shore ￿nancial center
and therefore alters the latter￿ s strategy. To attract onshore investors, the o⁄shore ￿nancial
center must raise its interest rates and forgo the pro￿ts on local investors. Similarly, the
o⁄shore government attracts onshore investors by cutting their tax rates and forgoing the tax
revenues on local investors. Let r and t denote the tupples (rH;rF) and (tH;tF). Let ￿i(r;t)
and Ti(r;t) be the pro￿ts and tax revenues if the o⁄shore center attracts onshore ordinary
investors. Let ￿A
F(r;t) and T A
F (r;t) de￿ne the o⁄shore center￿ s pro￿ts and tax revenues under
autarky when it does not attract any international investors. Autarkic pro￿ts and tax revenues
increase with the mass of o⁄shore local investors. The equilibrium is de￿ned as the Nash
equilibrium of the tax and interest rate games such that r￿














If the number of local investors is small, banks and governments are able to set low interest
rates and high enough tax rates so that they can obtain a pro￿t higher with ordinary investors
than without them. For instance, under monitoring behavior, the o⁄shore equilibrium interest
and tax rates are then given
r
￿
F = r ￿ c ￿
1
5





k (2 + 3lF)
As is apparent, a larger mass of local investors lF prevents the o⁄shore banks from raising their
interest rate while enticing the o⁄shore government to raise more taxes. Therefore, o⁄shore
jurisdictions with larger groups of local investors are weaker competitors and may avoid opening
29an o⁄shore international ￿nancial center. The same conclusion holds under lax behavior. We
then get the following proposition:
Proposition 5 There exist two numbers of local investors l1
F and l2
F such that the o⁄shore
jurisdiction supports/opens an o⁄shore international ￿nancial center if lF ￿ l1
F and such that
the o⁄shore jurisdiction and center concentrate on their local investors if lF ￿ l2
F. In the
former case, there exists a threshold aF such that the onshore center monitors if a ￿ aF and
both Propositions 1 and 3 apply.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As a result, jurisdictions with a larger number of local investors are less likely to be open
to international ￿nancial competition. When they are, their local investment size makes them
weaker competitors. The present discussion o⁄ers an explanation about why o⁄shore centers
with small populations and investor bases are more e⁄ective in attracting international in-
vestors. For instance, jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands are good candidates: in 2001, they
collected some US$ 13.82 million in total assets per capita, far more than the investment needs
of a local population of just 56,000 who work predominantly in the tourism industry.
7 Conclusion
International and national institutions pressure o⁄shore ￿nancial centers and their clients to
comply with anti-money laundering regulations. Many observers consider such a soft-law prac-
tice as ine¢ cient in combating money laundering by ￿nancial institutions. They claim that
money laundering and bank secrecy are inextricably linked and that only by undermining con-
￿dentiality laws can the ￿ght against ￿nancial crime be achieved. In this paper, we discuss
such pressure policies and assess their impact on money laundering. We employ a two-country
two-￿nancial center model with ordinary and criminal investors. Our modeling strategy ￿ts
with the standards of the economic literature not only in allowing interbank competition, but
also by modeling the tax competition between the onshore and o⁄shore ￿nancial centers. This
modeling strategy allows us to discuss the winners and losers of such pressure policies in a
clear-cut way. We show that aggregate pro￿t and tax revenues can increase under the e⁄ect of
30pressure policies because such policies can reduce interbank and tax competition. In addition,
we demonstrate that o⁄shore banks will comply with scrupulous monitoring of investors￿iden-
tities and the origin of their funds when the pressure has the potential to create su¢ cient harm
to an investor￿ s reputation. We ￿nd that an e¢ cient pressure policy is dichotomous in the sense
that a social planner chooses zero pressure or just enough pressure for compliance. We also show
that the implementation of pressure policies by an onshore tax institution may be ine¢ cient
as they can be biased towards the banking sector￿ s pro￿ts and can therefore never eliminate
criminal activity. Finally, we qualify the claim stating that deeper ￿nancial integration fosters
￿nancial criminality. In this model, ￿nancial integration reduces ￿nancial criminality. Such
results are not qualitatively altered by the presence of many o⁄shore jurisdictions or the fact
that the latter host a small group of local investors.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
We look for the maximum of ￿(a), a 2 [0;1),where ￿(a) = ￿m(a) if a 2 [aF;1) and ￿(a) =
￿o(a;￿) if a 2 [0;aF). Note that ￿m(a) is decreasing in a so that argmaxa2[aF;1) ￿m(a) = aF.
Also, because ￿o(a;￿) is a convex function of a (a 2 [0;aF)) we get that argmaxa2[0;aF) ￿o(a;￿)
2 f0;aF ￿ "g where " is an in￿nitely small positive number. Let us de￿ne the level ￿ such
that lim"!0 ￿o(aF ￿ ";￿) = ￿o(0;￿). One readily shows that argmaxa2[0;aF) ￿o(a;￿) is equal
to aF ￿ " if ￿ < ￿ and equal to 0 otherwise.
Consider ￿rst that ￿ < ￿. Then, the optimal pressure is a￿ = aF￿" if ￿o(aF￿";￿) ￿ ￿m(aF)
and a￿ = aF otherwise (see Figure 2). This situation arises if and only if lim"!0 T o
H(aF ￿ ") ￿
￿ (aF ￿ ") ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S ￿ T m
H (aF) ￿ ￿aF; that is, if ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ [T o
H(aF) ￿ T m
H (aF)]=[(1 ￿ ￿)S],
which simpli￿es to the expression shown in the text. Accordingly, we get the optimal pressure
a￿ = aF ￿ " if ￿ < ￿1 and a￿ = aF if ￿ ￿ ￿1.
33Consider secondly that ￿ > ￿ so that the optimal pressure is a￿ = 0 if ￿o(0;￿) ￿ ￿m(aF)
and a￿ = aF otherwise (see Figure 3). That is, if T o
H(0) ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S ￿ T m
H (aF) ￿ ￿aF.
This is equivalent to ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ [T o
H(0) ￿ T m
H (aF) + ￿aF]=[(1 ￿ ￿)S], which simpli￿es to the
expression shown in the text. Therefore, the pressure policy is a￿ = 0 if ￿ < ￿2, a￿ = aF if
￿ > ￿2. If ￿ = ￿2, then a￿ 2 f0;aFg. Since the latter case has a zero measure in the set of
parameters (￿;￿), we omit it in the proposition.
Appendix B: O⁄shore jurisdiction supply
To support the above analysis, we prove the following propositions. We assume that o⁄shore
jurisdictions l = 1;2;:::;N are present in the international ￿nancial market. All o⁄shore banks
make their monitoring decisions and then governments and ￿nancial centers make simultaneous
decisions over tax and interest rates. We solve this game by backward induction and derive the
sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 6 In the tax and interest rate sub-game, the o⁄shore ￿nancial centers l = f1;2;:::Ng
o⁄er net interest rates rl ￿tl no lower than r ￿c or r ￿a. Either o⁄shore jurisdictions collect




if c > a,
and ￿F1 if c < a.
Proof: Suppose that ￿nancial centers have made their monitoring decisions s = (s1;:::;sN)
where sl 2 fm;og. We ￿rst analyze the tax and interest rate decisions of o⁄shore institutions.
For a set of monitoring decisions s, both o⁄shore governments and ￿nancial centers play a
Bertrand competition game in terms of tax and interest rates. On the one hand, for a given
set of tax rates t￿ = (t￿
1;:::;t￿
N), the o⁄shore center l attracts the onshore ordinary investors
only if it can o⁄er the highest return net of tax or reputation loss; that is, either rl ￿ t￿
l when
it monitors or rl ￿ t￿
l ￿ a when it is lax. Each o⁄shore ￿nancial center overbids the interest
rate of other o⁄shore centers in order to become more attractive and reap the full demand of
international investors. Lax ￿nancial centers are able raise their interest rates up to r whereas
monitoring centers are able to raise them only up to r￿c without making a loss. On the other
hand, for a given set of interest rates r￿ = (r￿
1;:::;r￿
N), o⁄shore jurisdictions are also enticed
34to attract investors by diminishing their tax rates. Each o⁄shore government has incentives
to undercut its rival until its tax rate falls to zero. Let us denote the net return o⁄ered by
the most attractive o⁄shore ￿nancial center by nF ￿ rF ￿ tF ￿ ￿F ￿ minl (rl ￿ tl ￿ ￿l) where
￿l = 0 if l is monitoring and ￿l = a if l is lax.
Second, the onshore institutions set their optimal interest and tax rates given the o⁄shore
institutions￿decisions. The best response functions of the onshore jurisdiction and ￿nancial
center, r￿
H = argmaxrH ￿(rH;r￿;tH;t￿) and t￿
H = argmaxtH T(rH;r￿;tH;t￿), are computed as
e rH(r;tH;t) = 1
2 (r ￿ c ￿ k + tH + nF) and e tH(rH;r;t) = 1
2 (k + rH ￿ nF) where nF = rF ￿tF ￿
￿F is the net return of the most attractive o⁄shore ￿nancial center. Solving this system of two
identities w.r.t. rH and tH, we get the (joint) best response of the onshore jurisdiction and
￿nancial center as the following functions of nF: e rH (nF) = 1
3 [2r ￿ 2c ￿ k + nF] and e tH (nF) =
1
3 [r ￿ c + k ￿ nF]. The onshore ￿nancial center and jurisdiction o⁄er a net interest rate (net
of tax and reputation harm) to investors that is equal to e nH (nF) = e rH (nF) ￿ e tH (nF) =
1
3 (r ￿ c ￿ 2k)+ 2
3nF. The onshore pro￿t and tax revenues are then equal to e ￿H (nF) = e TH (nF)
=
￿
9kS (c ￿ k ￿ r + nF)
2.
We are now equipped to derive and discuss the interest and tax sub-game equilibrium. First,
if all o⁄shore centers monitor, s = (m;:::;m), all o⁄shore jurisdictions and ￿nancial centers
o⁄er their maximal interest rate r ￿ c and set their taxes to zero. The onshore jurisdiction
and ￿nancial center set a net interest rate equal to e nH (r ￿ c) and makes pro￿ts and tax
revenues equal to e ￿H (r ￿ c) = e TH (r ￿ c) = 1
9k￿S. The international ￿nancial market o⁄ers
no pro￿ts and no tax revenues for o⁄shore banks and jurisdictions. Second, if all o⁄shore
centers do not monitor, s = (o;:::;o), all o⁄shore jurisdictions and ￿nancial centers o⁄er the
maximal interest rate r and also set their taxes to zero. The onshore ￿nancial center sets a
net interest rate o⁄ered equal to e nH (r ￿ a). The onshore pro￿t and tax revenues are equal
to e ￿H (r ￿ a) = e TH (r ￿ a) = 1
9k￿S (a ￿ c + k)
2 if a ￿ c > ￿k and zero otherwise. Third,
if more than one center choose to monitor and more than one center choose not to monitor,
s = (m;:::;m;o;:::;o), all o⁄shore jurisdictions o⁄er their maximal interest rate r or r ￿ c and
also set their taxes to zero. If c < a, international investors deposit their funds at the rate
r ￿ c in the centers that monitor. Onshore pro￿ts and tax revenues are equal to e ￿H (r ￿ c)
35and e TH (r ￿ c). Otherwise, they deposit at the rate r ￿ a in the lax centers. Onshore pro￿ts
and tax revenues are equal to e ￿H (r ￿ a) and e TH (r ￿ a). Because of competition within each
group of o⁄shore monitoring and lax centers, no center makes a pro￿t and no jurisdiction gets
tax revenues.
Fourth, if all but one jurisdictions adopt a lax behavior, s = (m;o;:::;o), then the lax juris-
dictions and ￿nancial centers o⁄er their maximal interest rate r and set their taxes to zero. If
c > a, the monitoring jurisdiction is unable to compete with the lax jurisdictions even if it sets
its maximal interest rate r ￿ c and its tax to zero. Pro￿ts and tax revenues are then nil in all
o⁄shore jurisdictions. Onshore pro￿ts and tax revenues are equal to e ￿H (r ￿ a) and e TH (r ￿ a).
Otherwise, if c < a, the monitoring jurisdiction (say l = 1) is able to undercut the lax centers
and to o⁄er an net return equal to r ￿ a. The onshore pro￿ts and tax revenues are equal to
e ￿H (r ￿ a) and e TH (r ￿ a). The government and the banks of this monitoring o⁄shore jurisdic-
tion 1 then share the value of ￿F1 = (a ￿ c)[(r ￿ a) ￿ e nH (r ￿ a)]
￿S
k = (a ￿ c)(2k ￿ a + c)
￿S
3k.
Finally, if all but one jurisdiction monitors, s = (m;:::;m;o), then the monitoring juris-
dictions and centers o⁄er their maximal interest rate r ￿ c. If c < a, the lax jurisdiction and
￿nancial center are unable to compete for ordinary investors with the monitoring jurisdictions
even if it sets its maximal interest rate r and its tax to zero. The lax jurisdiction (say l = N)
then targets only the criminal investors so that its banking sector and its government share
the surplus obtained from those investors ￿FN = r(1 ￿ ￿)S. By contrast, the ￿nancial centers
and governments of monitoring jurisdictions make no pro￿ts and no tax revenues. Onshore
pro￿ts and tax revenues are equal to e ￿H (r ￿ c) and e TH (r ￿ c). Otherwise, if c > a, the
lax jurisdiction can compete with the monitoring jurisdictions by o⁄ering a net return equal
to r ￿ c. If the reputation harm a and the number of criminal investors 1 ￿ ￿ are not too
high, this strategy gives a pro￿t higher than targeting only criminal investors. This occurs if
￿FN = r(1 ￿ ￿)S is smaller than ￿FN = (c ￿ a)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)S + ￿1
k [r ￿ c ￿ e nH (r ￿ c ￿ a)]S
￿
=
(c ￿ a)[(3 ￿ ￿)k + 2a￿] 1
3kS. In any con￿guration, the maximal pro￿t that a jurisdiction can




if c > a, and ￿F1 if c < a.
We can now turn to the o⁄shore banks￿monitoring decisions s = (s1;:::;sN).
Proposition 7 All monitoring con￿gurations are Nash equilibria except the con￿guration where
36all o⁄shore ￿nancial centers monitor if c < a and the con￿guration where all o⁄shore ￿nancial
centers do not monitor if c > a.
Proof: We ￿rst prove that if c > a, all monitoring decisions except s = (m;:::;m) are Nash
equilibria. On the one hand, the con￿guration s = (m;:::;m) is not an equilibrium because any





deviating and choosing a lax behavior. On the other hand any con￿guration s = (m;:::;m;o)
is an equilibrium. Indeed, a monitoring ￿nancial center cannot increase its pro￿t by choos-
ing a lax behavior because this induces competition with the lax center. Also, the lax center
cannot increase its pro￿t by deciding to monitor as this decision makes it face the competi-
tion with the existing monitoring centers. The same argument applies for the con￿gurations
(m;:::;m;o;:::;o) and (m;o;:::;o). We secondly prove that if c < a, all monitoring decisions ex-
cept s = (o;:::;o) are Nash equilibria. Indeed, on the one hand, the con￿guration s = (o;:::;o)
is not an equilibrium because any single lax ￿nancial center can get a share of the positive pro￿t
￿F1 by deviating and choosing a monitoring behavior. On the other hand, the con￿gurations
s = (m;:::;m;o); (m;:::;m;o;:::;o) and (m;o;:::;o) are also equilibria as no deviations yield a
positive pro￿t due to the competition with other o⁄shore centers.
Appendix C: O⁄shore jurisdiction size
Let LF de￿ne the mass of o⁄shore local investors and let lF = LF=(￿S) de￿ne its share in the
total population (i.e. LF ￿ ￿SlF). To encompass both monitoring and lax behavior we de￿ne
(￿F;cF;￿F) = (0;c;0) if the o⁄shore bank F monitors (sF = m), and (￿F;cF;￿F) = (a;0;￿) if
it is lax (sF = o) where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ the relative share of criminal investors. We study the
equilibiurm under autarky and no autarky.
No autarky: Suppose that the o⁄shore center attracts ordinary investors. The share
of o⁄shore investors is given by xF = 1
k (rF ￿ tF ￿ ￿F ￿ rH + tH), whereas onshore and o⁄-
shore investor supplies are equal to DH = ￿SxH and DF = ￿S (xF + lF + ￿F). Pro￿ts and
tax revenues are equal to ￿H = DH (r ￿ c ￿ rH), ￿F = DF (r ￿ cF ￿ rF), TH = tHDH and
TF = tFDF. The interior Nash equilibrium is given by r￿
i = argmaxri ￿i(ri;r￿
￿i;t￿) and
37t￿
i = argmaxti Ti(r￿;ti;t￿

















[k (lF + ￿F) + rF ￿ rH ￿ ￿F + tH]
One computes the no-autarky Nash equilibrium as
r
￿
H = r ￿
1
5
[4c + ￿F + cF + k (3 + 2(￿F + lF))]
r
￿
F = r ￿
1
5












[k (2 + 3(￿F + lF)) ￿ ￿F + c ￿ cF]












[k (2 + 3(￿F + lF)) ￿ ￿F + c ￿ cF]
Pro￿ts and tax revenues are given by ￿￿





In this no-autarky equilibrium, the o⁄shore bank decides to monitor if its pro￿t ￿F is
greater under monitoring than lax behavior. Using the above values, one gets the condition
a > aF = c + 3k￿, which is independent of lF. At this value there exists a jump in the welfare
objective of a central planner so that Proposition 1 applies. Under a lax behavior where a < aF,
T ￿
F is again a convex, increasing function of a, which implies that Proposition 3 applies.
To be a no-autarky equilibrium, this equibrium must additionally yield higher pro￿ts and
tax revenues than the pro￿ts and tax revenues obtained when o⁄shore ￿nancial center and
government target their local investors. We now consider possible deviation of the o⁄shore
38center towards autarky. Let us consider an o⁄shore center with interest and tax rates (r￿
F;t￿
F).
On the one hand, suppose that the o⁄shore ￿nancial center reduces its interest rate and its
net return so that it foregoes the international investors. towards this aim, it sets the lowest
possible interest rate rF = t￿
F. This action decreases its pro￿t by an amount equal to
￿
￿
F ￿ ￿F = ￿S
￿













(r ￿ cF ￿ r
￿
F) (7)
￿￿S (lF + ￿F)(r ￿ cF ￿ t
￿
F)
which is positive if 24k2 (￿F + lF)
2 ￿(￿F + lF)k (25r ￿ 11c ￿ 22k + 11￿F ￿ 14cF) +(c + 2k ￿ ￿F ￿ cF)
2




(c + 2k ￿ ￿F ￿ cF)
2











On the other hand, suppose that the o⁄shore government increases its tax and and reduces the
net return in its jurisdiction so that it also foregoes the international investors. towards this
aim, it sets the highest possible tax tF = r￿




F ￿ TF = ￿S
￿





















F = r ￿ cF, this condition is equivalent to condition (7). A su¢ cient condition
is also lF < l1
F. Therefore, there is a no-autarky equilibrium if lF ￿ l1
F.
Autarky: We here characterize the interest and tax rates in this autarkic equilibrium and
the conditions under which it occurs. Suppose that the o⁄shore jurisdiction chooses autarky
by targeting only their own local investors. Under autarky, the o⁄shore ￿nancial center gets
a pro￿t given by ￿A
F = maxrF ￿S (lF + ￿F)(r ￿ cF ￿ rF) subject to the local investors￿par-
ticipation rF ￿ tA
F ￿ 0, while the o⁄shore government gets a reservation tax revenue given
by T A
F = maxtF ￿S (lF + ￿F)tF subject to rA
F ￿ tF ￿ 0. In those expressions, the superscript
A stands for the autarkic equilibrium. We compute that ￿A
F = ￿S (lF + ￿F)
￿




F = ￿S (lF + ￿F)rA
F while rA
F ￿ tA
F = 0. This yields rA
F = tA
F 2 [0;r ￿ cF] and
T A
F + ￿A
F = ￿S (lF + ￿F)(r ￿ cF). The same analysis occurs in the onshore jurisdiction:
rA
H = tA
H 2 [0;r ￿ c] and T A
H + ￿A
H = ￿S (r ￿ c). The investor￿ s net return (net of tax and
reputation harm) are nil in both jurisdictions.
Let us consider an o⁄shore center with interest and tax rates rA
F = tA
F. The o⁄shore ￿nancial
center prefers to not raise its interest rate rF and its net return to attract onshore investors
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decreases in rF from a non positive value at rF = rA









A su¢ cient condition is obtained by setting rF to its minimal value tA
F and setting tA
F to its

























k (r ￿ c) if monitoring center
1
k (r + a) ￿
1￿￿
￿ if lax center
Similarly, the government prefers to not reduce its tax tF and and not to raise its net return















tF ￿ ￿S (lF + ￿F)t
A
F
is always negative for tF < tA
F = rA
F. Indeed, this expression has a non positive value at tF = tA
F




F ￿ 2tF ￿ ￿A
F
￿
￿ 0. A su¢ cient condition for the
latter condition is obtained by setting tF to its maximal value rA
F and setting rA
F to its maximal
value r ￿ cF. So, we obtain lF + ￿F + 1
k
￿
r ￿ cF ￿ ￿A
F
￿
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Figure 1:  Pressure policy under delegation to onshore agency  
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Figure 2: Objective function of onshore agency under delegation ( γ γ < ) 
Figure 3: Objective function of onshore agency under delegation  ( γ γ > ) Recent titles 
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